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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Evidence-Search of Motor Vehicles for Intoxicating
Liquors Without Search Warrant
The 1951 amendment to G. S. 15-271 provides that "... no facts
discovered or evidence obtained without a legal search warrant in the
course of any search, made under conditions requiring the issuance of
a search warrant, shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any
action." As a result of this enactment, some confusion has arisen at
the law enforcement level as to the right of officers to search a motor
vehicle without a warrant, and at the trial court level as to the admis-
sibility of evidence so obtained. The language of the amendment
indicates that its purpose is to change the law of evidence in North
Carolina,2 and not the substantive law as to what constitutes legal or
illegal search. Therefore a search that was legal without a warrant
before the amendment became effective is still legal, and evidence so
obtained still competent.
Under the common law, lawful search without a warrant may be
made as an incident to arrest,3 or when the person in charge of the
premises consents thereto.4 In addition, by statute in North Carolina5
an officer may search a motor vehicle without a warrant if he has abso-
lute personal knowledge that the vehicle contains intoxicating liquor.6
A search of a motor vehicle made under other conditions requires a
valid search warrant to be legal.7 But heretofore evidence secured by
an illegal search without a warrant when a warrant was required has
nevertheless been admissible.8 It is this evidence which the 1951 amend-
ment renders incompetent.
A requirement that officers obtain a search warrant before law-
fully stopping and searching moving vehicles would make adequate
enforcement of the liquor laws impossible. For this reason moving
vehicles have been held to occupy an exceptional place under the law
of search and seizure in many states and in the federal courts. In
dealing with this question, the United States Supreme Court, rather
than relaxing the rule excluding illegally obtained evidence, chose in-
'N. C. SEss. LAws (1951),c. 644.
2 See A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1951, 29 N. C. L.
REv. 396 (1951).
3 State v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 905, 90 S. E. 408 (1916); State v. Graham, 74
N. C. 646 (1876).
'State v. Fowler, 172 N. C. 905, 90 S. E. 408 (1916).5 N. C. GEN. STAT. §18-6 (1943).
I In State v. Godette, 188 N. C. 497, 503, 125 S. E. 24, 28 (1924), the court
stated that absolute personal knowledge could be acquired through the sense of
seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or touching.
' Another possible exception to the rule requiring a search warrant is the
examination of an abandoned vehicle. But no cases have been found which touch
on this point.
8 State v. Vanhoy, 230 N. C. 162, 52 S. E. 2d 278 (1949) ; State v. McGee, 214
N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938) ; State v. Graham, 74 N. C. 646 (1876).
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stead to change the definition of an "illegal search." Carroll v. United
States0 held that if a search and seizure without warrant are made by
federal officers upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that a vehicle contains that which by law
is subject to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid. 10
Thus such officers may stop and search an automobile if they have prob-
able cause to believe that it is being used to transport intoxicating
liquor.1
The North Carolina and federal laws are now virtually the same in
holding evidence incompetent if obtained by a search made illegal be-
cause no warrant was used. But as to what constitutes a legal search
267 U. S. 132 (1925).
"0 The idea did not originate in the Carroll case. The First Congress, which
incidentally proposed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting un-
reasonable searches and seizures, in an act regulating duties in 1789 allowed "col-
lectors, naval officers and surveyors" to stop and search any ship or vessel in
which they shall have "reason to suspect" is carrying concealed goods subject to
a duty. L. STAT. 29, 43 (1789).
"' A corollary question is, when may an officer stop a moving vehicle in en-
forcement of the general law. Since the earliest common law days, constables in
England have been permitted to stop and investigate suspicious persons. 2 HAWK-
INS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN c. 13, §§5-6 (6th ed. 1787). The few state cases found
which have directly commented on the question have unanimously held that offi-
cers may stop and make reasonable inquiry of persons suspected of criminal con-
duct. No distinction has been made between misdemeanors and felonies, or
between persons riding or walking. See, e.g., People v. Henneman, 367 Ill. 151,
10 S. E. 2d 649 (1937); State v. Broas, 240 Mich. 490, 215 N. W. 420 (1927)
(defendant suspected of transporting liquor gave not only consent but an invita-
tion to search by handing officer keys to car) ; Hargus v. State, 58 Okla. Cr. 301,
54 P. 2d 211 (1935) ; Johnson v. State, 118 Tex. Cr. 293, 42 S. W. 2d 421 (1931) ;
Pena v. State, 111 Tex. Cr. 218 S. W. 2d 1015 (1928) ; State v. Zupan, 155 Wash.
80, 283 P. 671 (1929). The federal courts have indicated their position in holding
that if probable cause is acquired after stopping and questioning, but before the
actual search begins, the search is legal. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160(1949) ; Morgan v. United States, 159 F. 2d 85 (10th Cir. 1947).
Nearly all states have statutes similar to N. C. GEN. STAT. §20-183 (1943)
allowin& officers to stop motor vehicles for the purpose of examining the driver s
license without suspicion or reason to believe the driver is violating the driver's
license law. Therefore, it is believed that these statutes supplement the common
law right of officers to stop and question where he does have reason to suspect that
some other crime is, has been, or is about to be committed. There is an interest-
ing line of Tennessee cases, however, which in effect hold that the driver's license
inspection law has abrogated the common law right of officers to stop on suspicion
of other crime. Consequently, if an officer stops an automobile on suspicion of its
hauling liquor, examines the driver's license, and sees liquor in the car without
actually searching, the evidence is incompetent under the exclusionary rule on the
ground that the officer had no right to stop the car except to examine the driver's
license. Robertson et al. v. State, 184 Tenn. 277, 198 S. W. 2d 633 (1947) ; Smith
v. State, 182 Tenn. 158, 184 S. W. 2d 390 (1945) ; Cox v. State, 181 Tenn. 344,
181 S. W. 2d 338 (1944). In a later case, however, the Tennessee court seems to
recognize the common law right of officers to stop an automobile and investigate
on suspicion of criminal conduct other than motor vehicle violations. High v. State,
188 Tenn. 166, 217 S. W. 2d 774 (1949).
The courts seem to take for granted that officers have the right as a necessary
police measure to stop and make reasonable inquiry of persons suspected of crim-
inal conduct. This probably explains the small number of cases in which the courts
have directly commented on the question.
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of a vehicle without a warrant, the laws differ greatly in the two juris-
dictions,' 2 one having the "absolute personal knowledge" requirement,
while in the other only "probable cause" is required.
Of course, the purpose of the rule excluding illegally obtained
evidence which North Carolina has adopted 3 is to protect persons
from unreasonable searches and seizures.14  But there is an equal pub-
lic interest in the enforcement of the criminal law. The statutory
requirement of "absolute personal knowledge," together with the "ex-
clusionary rule" embodied in the amendment to G. S. 15-27, seems
to make adequate enforcement of the liquor laws impossible. Should
the "exclusionary rule" be continued, a substitution of the "probable
cause" federal test of legal search for the present requirement of "abso-
lute personal knowledge" might better serve all interests concerned.' 5
JACK WATTS WORSHAM.
Federal Jurisdiction-Three-Jufdge Court-Meaning of
"State Statute"
Congress has made provisions in certain types of situations where
an overriding public importance is involved for a special three-judge
district court to supplant the ordinary single-judge court, Such situ-
ations include equity actions by the United States under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act and the Interstate Commerce Act, actions to restrain the
enforcement of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission and
actions to restrain the enforcement of an act of Congress on the grounds
of its repugnance to the Constitution. An additional situation is where
an interlocutory or permanent injunction is sought in Federal district
"'Except search incident to arrest, or with consent.
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-27 (1943) made incompetent any evidence obtained by
a search that was illegal because the warrant was defective under the statute. It
was held in State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 196 S. E. 616 (1938) that it did
not exclude evidence obtained by an illegal search where no warrant at all was
used. The 1951 amendment to the statute corrects this anomalous situation.
"The rule was first suggested by the United States Supreme Court in Boyd
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1885). But it remained for Weeks v. United
States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914) to clearly establish the rule and its reason. Wigmore
severely criticizes the rule. 8 WiemoRE, EVIDENCE §§2183-2184 (3d ed. 1940).
See Harno, Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure, 19 ILL. L. REV.
303 (1925) ; Waite, Evidence-Police Regulations by Rile of Evidence, 42 MICH.
L. REv. 697 (1944). But see Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34
H av. L. REV. 361 (1921); Fraenkel, Recent Developments in the Law of Search
and Seizure, 13 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1928). The rule is not in effect in thirty-one
states, England, Canada, Scotland, and Australia. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S.
25, 38, 39 (1949).
"No cases have been found which indicate what standard North Carolina re-
quires for making a lawful search without a warrant for contraband other than
intoxicating liquor. It is believed that the standard of absolute personal knowl-
edge would be applied. See MACHEN, THE LAw OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 61(1950).
' MOORE, COMMENTARY ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE 125 (1949).
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